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Abstract—Cyber security for smart grid communication systems is one of the most critical requirements need to be assured
before smart grid can be operationally ready for the market.
Privacy is one of a very important security services. The customer
information privacy in smart grid need to be protected. Smart
grid data privacy encompasses confidentiality and anonymity
of the information extracted from smart devices and metering
transmission in a smart grid communication system. In this
paper, we consider a home area network as a basic reading
data aggregation and dispatch unit in smart grid systems, and
we propose a secure in-network data aggregation and dispatch
scheme to keep the confidentiality and anonymity for collecting
power usage information of smart home devices to the household
smart meter and for the reverse control message distribution
procedure. More specifically, we introduce an orthogonal chip
code to spread reading-data of different smart home devices into
spread code, followed by a circuit shifting operation to coupling
neighboring smart devices tightly. We adopt an in-network mechanism to further mask it with the spread data and its forwarding
data. Finally, we analyze the cyber security protection levels
using an information theoretic quantity - residual uncertainty.
Simulation studies are conducted to test the performance on
different metering datasets for the proposed scheme. This paper
sets the ground for further research on optimizing of home power
management systems with regarding to the privacy of customer
power usage behaviors.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Smart grid is characterized by two-way flows of both electricity and control information to create an automated, widely
distributed power network. It incorporates into the legacy electricity grid the benefits of communication networks to deliver
real-time monitoring and controlling data. It enables the nearinstantaneous balance of power supply and demand [1] [2]
in smart grid. A smart grid differs from a legacy power
grid in that it interconnects the grid components with a twoway communication system to support real-time operations
such as load shedding/management, distributed energy storage
(e.g. electric vehicles), and distributed energy generation (e.g.
renewable energy resources). For those purposes, Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is introduced into smart grid
which collects, measures and analyzes energy usage.
A smart meter in AMI can measure energy consumption
in much more details than a conventional electricity meter.
It can further forward the collected information to the authorized collectors (e.g. utilities), and facilitate real-time power
monitoring and control in smart grid. Usually, there is a smart
meter associated with each house or other resident site. A

smart meter is connected to all the intelligent electrical devices
or appliances through a home area network (HAN), to collect
the power usage and distribute the control message from/to
them.
The security of both smart metering data and electrical
appliances usage data is of prime sensitive, given the scale
of potential cyber threats. A classification of smart grid cyber
risks and vulnerabilities has been drafted by NIST [3]. The
problem of smart grid privacy has been discussed in [4].
In [5] the authors argued that AMI provides a window to
the activities within a home, exposing once private activities
to anyone with access to electricity usage information. Those
privacy threats go beyond the exposition of private information
to a hacker. AMI can facilitate the collating and analyzing of
such personal data on an industrial scale.
In this paper, we investigate the security and privacy of
the power usage data of electrical appliances level in a home
area network. The security and privacy of home area networks
is an integral part of the smart grid security. We propose
an in-network data spreading method to hide the information
containing in power consumption data by spreading meter
reading data with an unique chip code, after masking with
spreading data of others with certain circuit shift operation.
From the privacy viewpoint, we can hide or obscure metering
information of users so that appliance usage events cannot be
detected. We use a information theoretic quantity - residual uncertainty to evaluate the offered privacy protection. Simulation
results and further discussions suggest that our proposed innetwork meter reading aggregation and dispatch methods can
significantly improve privacy and efficiency of smart metering.
II. BACKGROUND
A. System Overview
Fig. 1 illustrates an overview of a home area network.
A home area network (HAN) constructs a basic unit of a
communication infrastructure for energy management in smart
grid. It comprises a smart meter, several smart electrical
appliances and alternative private energy sources converting
and storage devices such as wind turbines, solar panels,
electric vehicles, and batteries. We treat all those intelligent
appliances and devices as smart devices in the context of HAN.
A smart meter should collect real-time power consumption
and/or generation of each smart device in HAN using a popular
wireless technology (e.g., ZigBee). After collecting the reading
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of each smart device, smart meter aggregates the reading
data to get the overall power consumption and report the
aggregated data to local utility management office in the smart
grid system.

Smart Meter

Wireless Communication link
Fig. 1.

A home area network

B. Privacy Problem
Smart meters are expected to provide accurate readings automatically at requested time intervals to the utility company.
The expected frequency of smart meter readings is speculated
that this could be as every few (1-5) minutes, which raises
important privacy issues for processing of such data. The
detailed energy usage information could show the daily energy
usage patterns of a household and even go so far as to enable
deduction of what kind of device or appliance was in use at
any given time.
In [5] the authors discussed the privacy concerns with regard
to expected and/or projected availability of high-frequency
metering data. Another good argument for privacy is given in
a recent paper on Digital Inclusion and its ramifications [6].
There are some literature in load signature algorithms which
use energy measurements to extract detailed information regarding domestic appliance usage. This kind of research is
typically termed NALM (Non-intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring), as originally discussed in [7]. There is also a previous
work in the construction of appliance libraries and detection
algorithms in [8].
III. A N I N - NETWORK M ETER R EADING AGGREGATION
AND D ISPATCH S CHEME
In order to address the afore mentioned privacy threats, we
present an in-network meter reading aggregation and dispatch
scheme for smart devices in a HAN which can provide
secure and efficient communications. The design criteria of the
proposed in-network meter reading aggregation and dispatch
scheme are discussed in the following.
1) Device authentication: The identity and legality of the
smart devices should be verified before joining the HAN
with a smart meter and receiving the proper control
messages.

2) Data confidentiality: The smart device readings and control messages should be kept in confidential to conceal
privacy of consumers and the business information of
utilities from unauthorized entities.
3) Message integrity: The system should be able to verify that any meter-reading/management messages to be
delivered unaltered in AMI.
4) Maintaining secrecy: It should be ensured that some
secrecy of a smart device will always keep in privacy
while some secrecy should be shared with particular
partners to build secure communications.
5) Prevent potential cyber attacks: A smart device, by
holding its own digital credential and following certain processes in the proposed in-network collaborative
scheme, should be able to guarantee secure communication connections with the HAN. Even if an individual
smart device is compromised, the adversary cannot use
the compromised smart device to further access the
information of other smart devices or take the advantage
to penetrate the AMI in smart grid.
6) Facilitating communication overhead: Any security
scheme will bring additional overhead especially in
communication systems. The proposed in-network collaborative communication scheme should be efficient
in terms of communication overhead and processing
latency.

A. In-network Aggregation and Dispatch
As illustrated in Fig. 2, our proposed in-network aggregation
and dispatch scheme implement the smart device reading data
aggregated using hop by hop mode while control messages dispatched using broadcast mode rather than the basic service set
scheme in HANs. Using the propose in-network aggregation
and dispatch scheme, the smart meter can reconstruct every
reading data of each smart device since it have all the chip
codes used by the smart devices. Moreover, the smart meter
can use those chip codes to spread control message to each
smart device and then add the spread message together into a
single frame. By broadcasting this single frame to every smart
devices, each smart device can only retrieve its own control
message from the single frame since it only knows its own
chip code.

B. Chip Codes
Walsh function based on Hadamard code is a well-known
choice among many methods to generate orthogonal codes [9],
[10]. In this paper, we adopt it to generate mutual orthogonal
chip codes to be used in the secure in-network data aggregation and dispatch scheme we are proposing. The Hadamard
matrices of different dimensions (N) are established using the
following recursive expressions:
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Basic service set vs. in-network aggregation and dispatch system architecture for HANs
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where n is the number of active smart devices communicating with smart meter within HAN. The overscore of a matrix
denotes the complement operation. To convert a Hadamard
matrix into orthogonal codes, we take a row of the Hadamard
matrix.
Notice that the dot product for any pair of orthogonal codes
is zero.
WiN  WiN = 0

i, i ∈ {1, ..., N } and i = i
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Initialization Process for A Newly Boot-up Smart Device

C. Initialization Procedure
Fig. 3 illustrates the initialization procedure for each newly
boot-up smart device in the mutual authentication with both
smart meter and neighboring initialized smart device. Before
joining an authenticated HAN, the newly boot-up smart device
must be authenticated by the smart meter as an authentication
server as a legal device to terminal customers. The neighboring
authenticated smart device plays as a authenticator in the initialization procedure to convey the authentication transaction
messages between new smart device and smart meter. The
smart meter acts as a portal in both home electricity system
and HAN.

The newly boot-up smart device send smart meter its
digital identification as an authentication request, which can
be authenticated by the smart meter. If the authentication
for the new smart device identity is successful, the smart
meter sends back the verified digital identification of both
the new smart device and the smart meter. It will generate
a key K for the new smart device. The newly boot-up device
can also authenticate the smart meter by verifying the smart
meter digital identification and generate the K itself. After
the successful mutual authentications, the smart meter updates
its active device number n and Hadamard matrix W N if

This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE Globecom 2011 proceedings.

necessary.
The K generated after mutual authentication between newly
boot-up smart device and smart meter is unconcealed to any
devices else including its neighboring smart device. Because
both the consequent data masking chip code WnN and neighboring device mutual authentication key k between newly
boot-up smart device and neighboring initiated smart device
are encrypted by this K. If the identity of a newly bootup smart device is authenticated as a valid smart device,
the corresponding credential is established between the smart
meter and the new smart device. Then, the smart meter will
pick a row WnN from unoccupied Hadamard matrix rows as
the chip code for the authenticated smart device concatenating
with k. The WnN and k will be encrypted by K, so the new
smart device can decrypt and get its WnN and k. Meanwhile,
the smart meter sends the k to the neighboring smart device
encrypted with their own K  since the initiated neighboring
smart device authenticated with K  . So the neighboring smart
device knows the k, too.
With its k, the new smart device is initialized and it can
generate the kn−1,n individually and then conduct a four-way
handshake procedure to fulfill another mutual authentication
between them. After the successful mutual authentication,
kn−1,n at both the new smart device and the initialized
smart device sides are validated and ready to the consequent
reading data message authentication code (MAC) generation
and validation. SR and SL are negotiated during the four-way
handshake procedure, too. Where SR and SL are the number
of bit positions to be right shifted and left shifted, as described
in Section III.E.

Chip

Smart Device A

+1 +1 +1 +1

Chip code 1:

-1 -1 -1 -1

Chip

Smart Device B

Bit 0

Chip code 3:

+1 −1 −1 +1

Chip code 4:
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Chip code 2:

Chip

Smart Device C
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3
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Smart Device D

Bit 1
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Fig. 4.

Example of N = 4 chip codes for 4 active smart device data spread

Reading data
Data spread
Payload
Fig. 5.

MAC+padding

Data spread and MAC plus padding operation for reading data

Payload

MAC+Padding

SR
Fig. 6.

Circuit shift of payload to right-hand side with SR

SL

PayLoad

data : 1 → +1
data : 0 → −1
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1

D. Data Spread
Before data spread operation, we must represent the original
data bit 1 or 0 into bipolar form as well as consider the null
state when there is no data to present or in error state, as
shown in the following:

Bit 0

MAC+padding

(4)

Then, each original data bit can be spread into N × (N + 1)
bits spread code using its assigned chip code. Fig. 4 shows an
example that one bit original reading data have been spread
for 4 active smart devices with their chip codes accordingly.
After all bits of original reading data have been spread, the
MAC and padding bits if necessary will be appended to the
spread data as illustrated in Fig. 5. The MAC is generated
with key kn,n−1 . Therefore, its neighboring smart device can
validate the integrity of the data it received.

After received the right shifted frame, only the authenticated
neighboring smart device knowing SL can do the exactly left
hand side circuit shift with SL bits back to reverse the frame.
Then, the payload, MAC and padding bits are back to its right
position for the MAC verification, data aggregation or data
reconstruction.

E. Circuit Shift

F. Data Aggregation and Reconstruction

Instead transmit the spread data and MAC plus padding
bits directly, we further introduce a circuit shift operation for
the frame. As illustrate in Fig. 6, the spread reading data as
payload will shift to right hand side with SR bits.

As shown in the left part of Fig. 8, if the received data is
verified through MAC as validated, the received spread reading
data will be added to its spread reading data by each spread
code. Then each spread code will update the value hop by hop

Fig. 7.

Circuit shift of payload to left-hand side with SL
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An example for data aggregation and reconstruction in 4 active smart devices and smart meter

until it reaches the smart meter. In case the received data did
not pass the MAC verification, the smart device can simply
set it null and continue the procedure without any interruption
to the data aggregation procedure.
After verified the received data from the immediate smart
device, the smart meter can reconstruct all the reading data
from the aggregated data since the smart meter has all the chip
codes of the participated data aggregation smart devices. The
smart meter can even point out the exact smart device that from
whom the reading data become null in the data aggregation
procedure. The smart meter can take the proper actions using
its control message dispatch.
IV. P ERFORMANCE E VALUATION
A. Security Metric
In cryptography, privacy is typically discussed in the context
of anonymity, the property of hiding the identity of a user
associated with a message [11]. Typically, privacy levels are
analyzed stochastically. However, it is useful to quantify the
privacy level using information theoretic metrics [12], [13].
The undetectability property is to hide the information,
specifically as the source reading data in this paper. The nature
of information security evaluation problem allows us to use
a stochastic quantity - information entropy [14]. It is a well
known information theoretic quantity which can be used to
evaluate the sources of information. To employ this metric in
our security context, we assume that the processed data can
be modeled as a stochastic process with probability measure
P. If p(x) is the probability density function (pdf) of P, the
entropy H is defined:
1
(5)
p(x)
For data spreading, there are L = log2 N possible trials to
determine the right data spreading dimension N if using brutal
force search,
H = p(x) log

Hspread (x) = 2



x log x + 1

(6)

x∈L

The entropy of coupling operation of right and left circuit
shifts is
(7)
Hshif t (x) = log S
where S = SL = SR is the bits for the circuit shift between
coupling neighboring devices
The overall topology entropy for the in-network operation
of data spreading and circuit shift can be calculated as

x log x
(8)
Htopology (x) = 2 log Smax
x∈Nmax

Now, we can define the equivocation of the residual uncertainty R for an eavesdropper. With respect to the spread
dimension N as
R=
=

H(x|N )
H(x)
Hspread (x)·Hshif t (x)
Htopology (x)

(9)

When R = 0, the eavesdropper completely knows the
information source. When R = 1, the processed data does not
provide any information for the eavesdropper.
Fig. 9 shows residual uncertainty R with various reading
data length in term of the number of active smart devices.
We can observe that the residual uncertainty increases with
the number of active smart device, as the spread dimension N
increase while the various reading data length will not change
the residual uncertainty R severely when the number of active
smart device is small.
B. Delay Performance
We implemented a ns-2 simulation to evaluate the delay
performance of the proposed in-network data aggregation and
dispatch scheme. We assume that there are n active smart
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devices associated with a smart meter in a home area network.
Each smart device generates a data packet of reading every
second (1 packet/sencond) independently and need to send its
reading data packet to smart meter in 1 second. For simplicity,
we assume the reading data lifetime is equal to that of the
arrival of data packet. We assume that each smart device
reading data consists of 16 bytes. We run 10 realizations with
active smart device number from 1 to 10 and the simulation
time lasted for 100 seconds for each realization to obtain the
statistics.
The average transaction delays are shown in Fig. 10 for
various numbers of active smart devices. A transaction contains reading data collection from all active smart devices to
the smart meter and the reverse operation of control message
dispatch from the smart meter to smart devices. We can
observe that as the number of active smart devices increases,
the gap of average delay between the legacy reading data
collection and dispatch scheme using basic service set (BSS)
and our proposed in-network scheme becomes larger, although
BBS has a lower average transaction delay when the number of
active smart devices is small. The increasing translation delay
of the BSS with respect to the increasing number of smart
devices is much larger than that of the proposed in-network
scheme. Therefore, it is more practical to adopt the proposed
in-network scheme when there are many smart devices in a
home area network.
V. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a secure and efficient in-network
data aggregation and dispatch scheme for advance metering
infrastructure in home area networks for smart grid. In the
proposed scheme, the original reading data are spread and
then mixed up with the spreading code of other smart devices.
Only the smart meter can reconstruct the original reading data
from the mixed data using the chip code established with smart
devices in their initialization procedure through mutual authentications. The performance of the reading data aggregation and

dispatch has been analyzed subject to the HAN setting. The
levels of security has been discussed qualitatively, which lies
in the secrecy of pseudo-random spreading codes and circuit
shift. Simulation results have demonstrated the advantage of
the proposed scheme over the traditional BSS approach.
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